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Progress in the matter of memorializing the United States Congress
to call a convention for the purpose of considering and proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States limiting federal in-
come tax rates has reached the point where twenty-eight states have now
adopted resolutions on the issue. Similar action by four more state legis-
latures will be necessary in order that there may be an unquestionable
demand' by thirty-two states, or a number sufficient to meet the require-
ments of Article V of the Constitution, to put Congress in a position
where it would be obliged to act.
The accelerated speed of the movement, developing in the past few
years since the matter was first broached by the legislature of the State
of Wyoming, seems to have caused some concern on the part of those
presently in power in a few state legislatures for they would appear to
be attempting to halt the rate of progress by securing the adoption of
resolutions intended to rescind the favorable action taken by their states
at an earlier date. Four of the twenty-eight state legislatures which had
previously memorialized Congress calling for the submission of the amend-
ment in question, to-wit: Alabama,2 Illinois,3 Kentucky,4 and Wisconsin,5
have since adopted resolutions purporting to rescind their earlier memo-
rialization. The question has thereby been raised as to whether such
rescission resolutions are null and void and of no legal effect. It is be-
lieved that such is the case for the reasons hereinafter set forth.
It is essential to keep in mind the amendatory process described in
Article V of the federal constitution. That article contemplates that the
Congress (a) shall, when two-thirds of both houses deem it necessary,
"'propose amendments" to the constitution; or (b), "on the application of
the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states," shall call a convention
for proposing amendments. The article further recites that the amend-
ments, "in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes . . .
when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states,
or by conventions in three-fourths thereof."6
1 See Packard, "Legal Facets of the Income Tax Rate Limitation Program," 30
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 128 (1952), particularly pp. 137-40, on the point of
whether or not the necessary quorum has already been achieved.
2 Ala. Acts 1945, p. 155.
3 Ill. Laws 1945, p. 1797.
4 Ky. Acts 1946, p. 720.
5 Wis. Laws 1944-5, pp. 1126-7.




In view of the constitutional expression that either of these methods
is to possess equal effect with the other it should be possible to compare
the state memorialization method with the congressional method and
thereby reach the result that what is true of the one is equally true of
the other. If that comparison is proper, and no reason appears why it is
not so, then it follows that what would be true of a congressional attempt
to withdraw a proposed amendment which it had once submitted would
likewise be true of the attempt by a state to rescind an action it had
taken looking toward the same end.
Except as Congress may limit the time within which ratification
may be given to one of its proposals, it is clear that Congress is without
the power to withdraw a proposed amendment which it has once sub-
mitted. Professor Orfield is authority for the proposition that an attempt
by Congress to withdraw a proposed amendment, after it had secured the
necessary vote of two-thirds of both houses, would be a nullity. In his
book on the subject of amending the federal constitution, he noted that
the "question was directly raised in 1864 when Senator Anthony proposed
to repeal the joint resolution submitting the Corwin amendment," and he
declared the practice to be "to regard such a withdrawal as ineffectual,"
on the theory that each affirmative step taken in the passage of an amend-
ment is irrevocable. If such were not the case, he wrote, "confusion would
be introduced if Congress were permitted to retract its action." 7  Much
the same view has been shared by Professor Burdick. In his textbook on
the American Constitution, he wrote: "It seems safe to assert that Con-
gress, having once submitted a proposed constitutional amendment to the
States, cannot thereafter withdraw it from their consideration. "8
Considering the demonstrated equality between the two methods of
procuring a constitutional amendment, it is not illogical to apply the
same reasoning to state action intended to rescind an application made by
a state legislature for the calling of a convention to consider and propose
amendments. As Professor Orfield has said, "the analogy of a state legis-
lature's attempting to withdraw its ratification of an amendment would
seem apposite." 9
Additional proof may be found in the comparison which exists be-
tween a purported congressional withdrawal of a proposal on the one
hand and a state attempt to withdraw its ratification of a proposed amend-
ment on the other. The United States Supreme Court itself once pointed
7 Orfield, The Amending of the Federal Constitution (University of Michigan
Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1942), p. 52.
8 Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution: Its Origin and Development
(G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1922), p. 39.
9 Orfield, op. cit., p. 52.
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out that "proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but
as succeeding steps in a single endeavor.''10 In that endeavor, state gov-
ernments do not act on the basis of their sovereign status but under a
special power conferred by the national constitution. As Judge Jameson
wrote, the power to amend the constitution is not a power belonging to the
states "originally by virtue of rights reserved or otherwise." As a con-
sequence, "when exercised, as contemplated by the constitution, by ratify-
ing, it ceases to be a power, and any attempt to exercise it again must be
a nullity ... [Once] ratified, all power is expended."" 1
That view also has the support of the eminent Professor Dodd. He
has stated that the view "is incontrovertible, that a state, once having
ratified, may not withdraw that ratification . . . to construe the Con-
stitution otherwise, would be to permit great confusion in that no state
in ratifying could know what the status of the amendment was if at the
same time other states were permitted to withdraw. Of course, confusion
would occur also in that it would be difficult to know when three-fourths
of the states had ratified . . .The function of ratification seems to be
one which, when once done, is fully completed and leaves no power what-
ever in the hands of the state legislature. "12
The highest courts of two of the American states have achieved the
same conclusion. In Wise v. Chandler,18 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
said: "It is the prevailing view of writers on the question that a resolu-
tion of ratification of an amendment to the Federal Constitution, whether
adopted by the Legislature or a convention, is irrevocable. This conclu-
sion seems inescapable as to the action of a convention called for the pur-
pose of acting upon an amendment. When it has acted and adjourned,
its power is exhausted. Since the 'powers and disabilities' of the two
classes of representative assemblies mentioned in Article V are 'precisely
the same', when a Legislature, sitting, not as a lawmaking body, but as
such an assembly, has acted upon a proposal for an amendment, it like-
wise has exhausted its power in this connection."1 4  The Supreme Court
of Kansas, about the same time and through the medium of the case of
Coleman v. Miller,15 declared: "It is generally agreed by lawyers, states-
men and publicists who have debated this question that a . . . ratifi-
10 See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368 at 374, 41 S. Ct. 510 at 512, 65 L. Ed. 994 at
997 (1921).
11 Jameson, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions: Their History, Powers
and Modes of Proceeding (Callaghan & Company, Chicago, 1887), §§ 579 and 581.
12 Dodd, "Amending the Federal Constitution," 30 Yale L. J. 321 (1921), particu-
larly p. 346.
13 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. (2d) 1024 (1937).
14 270 Ky. 1 at 8-9, 10S S. W. (2d) 1024 at 1028.
15 146 Kans. 390, 71 P. (2d) 518 (1937).
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cation once given cannot be withdrawn . . . [From] historical prec-
edents, it is . . . true that where a state has once ratified an amendment
it has no power thereafter to withdraw such ratification. To hold other-
wise would make article 5 of the federal constitution read that the amend-
ment should be valid 'when ratified by three fourths of the states, each
adhering to its vote until three fourths of all the legislatures shall have
voted to ratify.'. . . [When] a proposed amendment has once been rati-
fied the power to act on the proposed amendment ceases to exist. "16
What room is there, then, for supposing that a different view should
be applied to the matter of retracting a state resolution calling upon
Congress for a convention to consider a proposed amendment? When a
state adopts an original resolution memorializing Congress to that end,
it is not exercising a sovereign power exclusively its own, nor merely leg-
islating simply on behalf of its own people, but is engaging in a "federal"
function. That fact places such activity within the exclusive domain of
federal jurisdiction and completely removes the same from the pale of
the state province and beyond the power of state withdrawal. The truth
of this is manifest since the function of a state legislature, in memorializ-
ing Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing an amend-
ment, is derived wholly from the federal constitution. It is no different,
in source, than the function of Congress in proposing an amendment, or
the function of a state legislature voting to ratify the same. Since the
latter functions have been judicially identified as "federal functions"
totally without state realm,17 the conclusion would appear inescapable that
the purported rescinding resolutions are of no effect whatever. It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that Congress should act, at the latest, when four more
state legislatures vote in favor of a constitutional convention to consider
the proposed income tax rate limitation amendment.
F. E. PACKARD
16146 Kans. 390 at 400-3, 71 P. (2d) 518 at 524-6.
17 In Coleman v. Miller, 146 Kans. 390 at 392-3, 71 P. (2d) 518 at 520 (1937), the
Supreme Court of Kansas said: "It is settled beyond controversy that the function
of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the constitution of the
United States, like the function of congress in proposing an amendment, is a federal
function derived from the federal constitution; and it transcends any limitation
sought to be imposed by the people of a state. The power to legislate in the enact-
ment of the laws of a state is derived from the people of the state, but the power
to ratify a proposed amendment to the federal constitution has its source in that
instrument. The act of ratification by the state derives its authority from the
federal constitution, to which the state and its people alike have assented. . . . If
the legislature, in ratifying a proposed amendment, is performing a federal function,
it would seem to follow that ratification is not an act of legislation in the proper
sense of that term. It has been so held."
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TORTS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Some thirty years ago, one prominent writer in the field of family
law stated: "The changes that have been effected among married people
in our day . . .have left no mark on our law. The economic, intellectual
and political independence of women, the breakdown of religion . . . have
definitely altered the marriage relationship of the parties concerned. But
the law has not kept apace. Matrimonial jurisprudence is anachronistic.' ,
About the same time, another writer, when discussing the subject of tort
liability between persons in the domestic relation, pointed out, as if in
contrast, that the "great battleground [in law] has been the matter of
torts affecting primarily the person" of those related by marriage. 2 From
the standpoint of either of these views, it is proper to note that little has
occurred in Illinois during the period since these men wrote to indicate
the presence of any local battleground on the point. A fairly rapid suc-
cession of events within the last year, however, has disclosed that the stage
of warfare has been reached here, although the eventual outcome of the
struggle is yet uncertain.
What to others may have been a perplexing problem of tort liability
as between the spouses3 seems to have been resolved in this state, for many
years, as being no problem at all.4 The decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Welch v. Davis," one permitting an administrator, on behalf of
a step-daughter, to sue a deceased husband's estate to recover for the
wrongful death of his wife, the child's mother, surprised many lawyers
and may have served to reopen a door hitherto deemed closed. When that
decision led to the result attained in Tallios v. Tallios,6 to the effect that
a wife might be permitted to recover from her husband's employer for a
tort committed by the husband in the course of his employment, the door
seemed to have swung wide.
It was probably on the basis of the liberal trend disclosed by these
1 See Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 30 Col. L. Rev. 651-73 (1930),
at p. 651.
2 McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation," 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1030-82 (1930), at p. 1041.
3 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 1941), p. 897,
states: "Few topics tn the law of torts, in view of modern economic, social and
legislative changes, display in their treatment greater inconsistency and more un-
satisfactory reasoning."
4 See Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1891), and Garlin v. Garlin, 260 Wis. 187,
50 N. W. (2d) 373 (1951), construing the Illinois statute.
5410 Ill. 130, 101 N. E. (2d) 547 (1951), reversing 342 Ill. App. 69, 95 N. E. (2d)
108 (1950), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 242.
6345 Ii1. App. 342, 103 N. E. (2d) 507 (1952), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 583. See also
the later case of Kitch v. Adkins, 346 Ill. App. 342, 105 N. E. (2d) 527 (1952),
where the court decided a similar fact situation without discussion of the marital
immunity. Leave to appeal therein has been denied.
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decisions that the plaintiff, in the most recent case of all, that of Brandt
v. Keller,7 sought to revive interest in the question of whether or not a
wife might sue her husband directly to recover damages for a tort inflicted
by him on her. The case was one in which the plaintiff sustained personal
injuries while a passenger in the automobile being driven by the defendant,
husband of the plaintiff, allegedly because of the defendant's negligence.
The trial court decided against the plaintiff and dismissed her suit. The
Appellate Court for the First District, on appeal from such judgment,
deeming it significant that no previous case had arisen in the seventy-odd
years since the adoption of a Married Women's Act,8 affirmed the holding,
saying that the Illinois statute did not grant to a married woman a cause
of action against her husband for a tort committed by him against her
person.
The precise question of inter-marital personal tort liability has long
been before the courts of this country and has been a source of conflict
and confusion. Prior to the advent of legislation on the subject, the
common-law rule appears to have been uniformly accepted that neither
spouse could sue the other in tort,9 principally because of procedural
difficulties inherent in the conduct of such a case. Laudable attempts by
state legislatures to free married women from the yoke of their common
law insignificance, generally described as Married Women's Acts, which
in any way deal with this point can be divided into several distinct cate-
gories, to-wit: (1) those which expressly exclude or refuse to authorize
suits between husband and wife; (2) those which permit suits by and
against married women as if they were sole; and (3) those which expressly
allow suits in tort between husband and wife.10  It can readily be ascer-
tained, therefore, that only those statutes which fall into the second group
are likely to cause trouble. As these statutes do not demand either of the
results attained elsewhere, the end determined turns mainly on the degree
to which courts may feel the legislature intended to abrogate the common
law.
One of the landmark cases in this field, that of Thompson v.
Thompson," a case involving a wife's suit against her husband for an
assault and battery, required the Supreme Court of the United States to
7 347 Ill. App. 18, 105 N. E. (2d) 796 (1952).
8 R. S. 1874, p. 576; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1 et seq.
9 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, § 589; 30 C. J., Husband and Wife, § 317, p.
714; McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation," 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1030-82 (1930), at p. 1031.
10 The several statutes are classified in Vernier, American Family Laws (Stanford
Univ. Press, Stanford University, California, 1935), Vol. 3, § 180, and 1938 Supp.,
p. 180.
11218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180 (1910), aff. 31 App. D. C. 5,57, 14
Ann. Cas. 879 (1908). Harlan, J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by
Justices Holmes and Hughes.
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interpret a statute of the District of Columbia which gave married
women the right to "sue separately for the recovery, security, or protec-
tion of their property; and for torts committed against them, as fully and
freely as if they were unmarried." 12 The majority of that court, setting
a pattern for what was to become the majority view, denied recovery on
the basis that the statute, being in derogation of the common law, had to
be strictly construed. The majority also set out what were to become the
stock arguments used by later courts of similar mind on such matters as
public policy and the sufficiency of remedies provided for married women
by criminal proceedings and via the divorce court. In cse their interpre-
tation was wrong, the majority pointed out that "if the legislature wishes
to abrogate [the common law view] it should do so by language so clear
and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intent." 13
The tenor of the minority view, voiced in a dissenting opinion by Justice
Harlan which was concurred in by Justices Holmes and Hughes, noted
that the majority were creating an exception not called for by the words
of the statute but one based upon their own opinion of what public policy
and the law should be rather than what the legislature had declared the
law to be.
Following the Thompson case, which had spoken only on the point as
it related to the domestic law of the District of Columbia, courts which
were presented with the problem invariably followed the reasoning of one
or the other of these opinions. The results attained, and the logic behind
such results, have been viewed with disfavor by most of the eminent
authors who have written on the subject as well as by some of the judges
who, impelled by stare decisis, have reached the same result as the one
they were criticizing.' 4 But this criticism has not swayed the courts and
recovery has been denied in cases of assault and battery,15 malicious prose-
cution,1 6 false imprisonment,
17 fraud,'8 slander,19 libel, 20 and negligence.
21
12 D. C. Code, § 1155.
13 218 U. S. 611 at 618, 31 S. Ct. 311, 54 L. Ed. 1180 at 1183.
14 The case of Gregg v. Gregg, - Md. -, 87 A. (2d) 581 (1952), provides an
example of a court following tradition while at the same time criticizing its own
decision. The opinion in Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. (2d) 660
(1939), furnishes a comprehensive report on the division of authority.
15 Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 P. 219, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699 (1909);
Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 187 S. W. 295 (1916) ; Strom v. Strom,
98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 191 (1906).
16 Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159 N. E. 656 (1927).
17 Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 382 (1915).
18 Seelau v. Seelau, 198 N. Y. S. 41 (1923).
19 Clark v. Clark, 11 F. (2d) 871 (1925).
20 Faris v. Hope, 298 F. 727 (1924).
21 Spector v. Weisman, 40 F. (2d) 792, 59 App. D. C. 280 (1930) ; Blickenstaff v.
Blickenstaff, 89 Ind. App. 529, 167 N. E. 146 (1929) ; Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896,
62 S. W. (2d) 1084, 89 A. L. R. 1114 (1933).
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Since the fault is usually said to be the lack of a cause of action, it has
been considered immaterial that the spouses were separated,2 2 have since
been divorced, 23 that the marriage was voidable and has been annulled,24
or that one of the spouses has died and a personal representative is suing
or defending.
25
Undoubtedly the common law forbade a cause of action for a personal
tort between husband and wife, basically upon the feudalistic concept of
the unity between the spouses.2 6 All courts agree that whatever rights a
wife have must, therefore, have been given her by statute so, to the extent
the Married Women's Act in the particular jurisdiction has operated to
destroy this unity, there would or would not seem to be valid legal reason
for denying a cause of action. Deny it, however, most courts have done, 27
some justifiably under the wording of the particular statute, others under
an interpretation of wording which would seem to call for a complete
emancipation of married women from the bonds of the strict and unjust
common-law rule.
2 8
The doctrine most often invoked to aid those courts which deny
recovery is the one which provides that, in the construction of a statute,
all statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.
29
While this constructional rule is appropriate to the interpretation of
statutes like the Married Women's Acts, for such statutes are certainly
in derogation of the common law, it must not be forgotten that the cardinal
rule in any constructional problem is one calling for a determination of
the intent of the legislature,3 0 no matter what type of statute may be
involved. There is, however, another rule of construction which would
tend to balance the one first mentioned and it requires that statutes which
are remedial in character are to be liberally construed.3 1 While all of the
22 Clark v. Clark, 11 F. (2d) 871 (1925).
23 Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. 106 (1891) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877);
Speer v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451, 119 S. W. 86 (1909).
24 Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 55, 78 N. E. (2d) 637, 2 A. L. R. (2d) 632 (1948).
25 In re Dolmage's Estate, 204 Iowa 231, 213 N. W. 380 (1927). But see Welch v.
Davis, 410 IlL 130, 101 N. E. (2d) 547 (1951).
26 See authorities cited in note 9, ante.
27 Most of the cases are listed in the opinion in Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla.
395, 87 P. (2d) 660 (1939).
28 Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591, 33 A. L. R. 1388 (1924), represents
such an example.
29 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180 (1910);
Anderson v. Board of Education, 390 Ill. 412, 61 N. B. (2d) 562 (1945) ; Leonardi v.
Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N. E. 93 (1926).
30 Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U. S. 635, 50 S. Ct. 440, 74 L. Ed. 1082 (1930). See
also Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863-85 (1930), particularly
p. 869.
31 Gray v. Bennett, 44 Mass. 522 (1842) ; Hasson v. City of Chester, 67 W. Va.
278, 67 S. E. 731 (1910).
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Married Women's Acts are remedial in scope, some courts have disallowed
tort recovery between the spouses by merely looking for the presumed
intent of the legislature to the disregard of the other constructional rules.
It must be said, in their favor, that in very few instances, following such
a construction of a particular statute, has there been any amendment of
the statute to authorize the maintenance of an action,3 2 so it may be argued
that these majority-view decisions represent an accurate interpretation of
the intent of the legislature.
Most courts invoking the majority view, however, seem to feel a need
to reinforce the construction adopted with other reasons. One purported
reason is a stated belief that the allowance of such an action between the
spouses would be contrary to public policy as it would, supposedly, tend
to disrupt the harmony and peace of the marital relation. Although this
concept was invoked quite early in the history of this struggle, as is
indicated by the Michigan case of Bandfield v. Bandfield3s where the court
said "the result of plaintiff's contention would be another step to destroy
the sacred relationship of man and wife, and, to open the door to lawsuits
between them for every real and fancied wrong,-' 34 the concept has been
severely criticized. The answer of the minority is best expressed in the
Oklahoma case of Fiedler v. Fiedler.3" The court there said: "We fail
to comprehend wherein public policy sustains a greater injury by allowing
a wife compensation for being disabled ... than it would by allowing her
to go into a criminal court and prosecute him. . . .Nor are we able to
perceive wherein the sensitive nerves of society are worse jarred by such
a proceeding than they would be by allowing the parties to go into a
divorce court and lay bare every act of their marriage relations in order
to get alimony.'"36 It might be added that there would seem to be no
more of a menace to public policy in a personal tort action between the
spouses than there is in a tort suit between them concerning their separate
property.37 If newspaper reports from the divorce courts are to be
believed, the minority view concerning the effect on public policy would
certainly seem to be the more realistic one.
The fear of a flood of litigation "for every real and fancied wrong"
may also have been a restraining factor, especially with courts already
32 The change in the law of New York, for example, appears to have been gen-
erated more by the holding in Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y.
253, 164 N. E. 42, 64 A. L. R. 293 (1928), than by the decision in Schultz v. Schultz,
89 N. Y. 644 (1882), and the cases like it. See N. Y. Laws 1937, Ch. 669; Cahill's
Cons. Laws N. Y., 1937 Supp., Ch. 14, § 57.
33 117 Mich. 80, 75 N. W. 287, 40 L. R. A. 757 (1898).
34 117 Mich. 80 at 82, 75 N. W. 287 at 288.
35 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 1022, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 189 (1914).
36 42 Okla. 124 at 126, 140 P. 1022 at 1023-4.
37 Larison v. Larison, 9 Ill. App. 27 (1881).
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overburdened with work. Supposing the fear to be one founded in fact,
would it afford a valid reason for refusing the remedy? The mere pro-
pounding of the question operates to provide the answer, but in actual
practice, in those states which have allowed one spouse to sue the other on
a personal tort, there has been no report of a deluge of such actions, either
real or fancied. Certainly, then, any belief that the permitting of such
suits would operate to create an inherent liability for every unwarranted
or undesirable touching in the course of normal family life is equally
without foundation.
As most suits of this character would be likely to develop from the
negligence of one spouse while operating an automobile, some of the
majority opinions have also expressed a fear that the treasuries of insur-
ance companies would become subject to constant raiding, particularly
from collusive suits. The answer thereto, if not already provided by so-
called "guest" statutes, lies in the fact that the law does not presume
fraud but it does furnish protection against it. In any event, as the
Illinois court in the Brandt case indicated, such an argument "is not
relevant. "8 To say that other remedies are available also begs the ques-
tion. They either fail to provide appropriate compensation or give none
at all. Instead of being adequate, as was noted in the Alabama case of
Johnson v. Johnson,39 these remedies appear to be illusory at best.
It has also been urged, as the basis for a denial of recovery, that to
construe a married woman's statute so as to permit suit would give rise
to the inconsistency that, while a married woman would be able to sue her
husband for his torts, he would be denied a reciprocal right. That situa-
tion did exist for a while in Wisconsin. The Married Women's Act of
that state40 had been construed to give a wife a cause of action against her
husband in the case of Wait v. Pierce,41 but in Fehr v. General Accident
Fire & Life Assurance Corporation,42 where the plaintiff husband had
been injured by reason of the wife's negligence in driving her automobile,
the court held that the statute was not designed to give the husband a
cause of action, and, as he did not have one at common law, he was without
a remedy. The Wisconsin legislature remedied the situation soon after-
ward by passing a statute giving husbands the same rights as are enjoyed
by their wives.
43
The fear of such a situation has undoubtedly led courts to reach a
decision denying the wife a cause of action and at least one Minnesota
8 347 Il. App. 18 at 30, 105 N. E. (2d) 796 at 802.
39 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335, 6 A. L. R. 1031 (1917).
40 Wis. Stats. 1951, § 246.07.
41 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475, 48 A. L. R. 276 (1926).
42 246 Wis. 228, 16 N. W. (2d) 987, 160 A. L. R. 1402 (1945).
43 Wis. Stats. 1951, § 246.075.
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case declares that the statute of that state was intended to do no more
than put married women on equal footing with men.4 4  It would seem,
however, that if the disability against suit lay in the unity of the spouses,
and if that unity has been removed, certain legal consequences should
follow, among them a cause of action for any invasion of those personal
rights which are accorded to every legal being. While this line of thought
has been advanced in favor of giving a married woman a cause of action
in tort against her husband,45 it has usually been overlooked in connection
with the problem of the husband's equal right to sue his wife.
Although fault has been found with the conclusion and reasoning of
the majority of the courts on this point, the principal fault would seem
to lie at the doorstep of the legislature. The statutes presented to the
judiciary for construction are, in the main, ambiguous in their handling
of the particular issue, but there is nothing therein that a few well-chosen
words would not correct. By the adoption thereof, the legislature could
readily perform its function of declaring the pertinent public policy and
could thereby remove a problem from the already overburdened shoulders
of the courts.
S. Kmsn
44 Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N. W. 1022 (1922). The statute con-
cerned stated: "Women shall retain the same legal existence and legal personality
after marriage as before, and every married woman shall receive the same protec-
tion of all her rights as a woman which her husband does as a man."
45 See dissenting opinion of Ethridge, J., in Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61 at 73,
100 So. 591 at 593, 33 A. L. R. 1388 (1924).
